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DODD-FRANK, LIABILITY STRUCTURE, AND
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY CYCLES:
NEITHER A (PONZI) BORROWER
NOR A LENDER BE
Josg Gabilondo*
INTRODUCTION
The financial sector has by now mostly sprung back from the
crisis that began in 2007, as have corporate profits; but the labor
market still sags, mortgage credit is scarce, and the future prospects
for the economy, while not bleak, are not rosy either. Seeing this
ongoing harm to the real economy caused by financial activities,
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act ("Act") with an eye to limiting
future financial instability.' The Act hopes to do this by updating
financial regulation and creating better incentives for the private
sector.
To see how the crisis developed and whether the Act will work,
we need to understand how financial instability develops in
capitalist market systems like ours. Economist Hyman Minsky
claimed that the financial sector in capitalist market systems tends
to chase returns by gorging on risk until its own financial structure
becomes unstable, leading to a crisis like the last one that started in
2007.2 The claim-known as the financial instability hypothesis-
merits our attention because, though critical of the financial sector,
evidence for it is derived from observing how banks actually operate
over the business cycle.
I use the hypothesis in Part I to show what animated the last
corporate leverage cycle: escalating expectations for profit financed
on progressively riskier credit terms. In fact, the hypothesis belongs
to a larger critique of conceptual approaches that deny the intrinsic
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law,
College of Law, Florida International University, Miami, gabilond@flu.edu. My
thanks go to Alan Palmiter and Kent Greenfield for including me in the
Symposium, "The Sustainable Corporation." As always, I am overleveraged to
Charles Pouncy for his valuable comments on this Article. I would also like to
thank and praise the Wake Forest Law Review staff for their extraordinarily
fine contributions to this piece.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
2. John Cassidy, The Minsky Moment, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 19.
469
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
instability of capitalist market systems, so I also use Minsky's work
to challenge claims made by nabobs of neoliberal negativism who
are resisting the implementation of the Act. Part II addresses two
aspects of the Act that bear directly on how the financial sector
creates potentially destabilizing liabilities: (i) new requirements
that leverage caused by financial swaps be margined and cleared;
and (ii) a new mandate that federal regulatory capital requirements
go in the opposite direction of the boom-bust dynamics characteristic
of the business cycle.
I. LIABILITY STRUCTURES Do MATTER
Hyman Minsky was an economist trained at Harvard in the
1940s under economic historian Joseph Schumpeter.3 His
theoretical work on the financial system was informed not only by
the then recent memory of the Depression but by his service as a
bank director.4 Minsky observed that "[i]t turns out that the
fundamental instability of a capitalist economy is a tendency to
explode-to enter into a boom or 'euphoric' state," followed by a
bust.5 When times were good, he said, firms took on riskier debt to
invest in speculative assets, an unsustainable strategy that would
lead, in time, to a crash.6 He believed that government policy could
contribute to the long term viability of capitalism by slowing down
these boom-bust cycles.7 Doing this would mean going against
prevailing market sentiment.
Minsky's conceptual framework was not widely received by the
academic establishment of his day, which followed the direction of
Platonic quantitative modeling that assumed away the grittiness of
economic life.8 The last crisis painfully illustrated the financial
instability hypothesis, which is now being reappraised and adopted
more widely. As before, though, the idea that the government
should actively intervene in the financial market faces renewed
political opposition.
A. Borrowing by Firms
Minsky's analysis starts by looking at a firm's balance sheet, an
3. See James S. Earley, Joseph Schumpeter: A Frustrated "Creditist," in
NEW PERSPECTIVES IN MONETARY MACROECONOMICS: EXPLORATIONS IN THE
TRADITION OF HYMAN P. MINSKY 337, 338 (Gary Dymski & Robert Pollin eds.,
1994).
4. Cassidy, supra note 2.
5. HYMAN P. MINSKY, Financial Instability Revisited: The Economics of
Disaster, in CAN "IT" HAPPEN AGAIN? ESSAYS ON INSTABILITY AND FINANCE 117,
118 (1982).
6. See id. at 122-24.
7. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, Capitalist Financial Processes and the
Instability of Capitalism, in CAN "IT" HAPPEN AGAIN?, supra note 5, at 71, 86.
8. See generally Gary Dymski & Robert Pollin, Introduction, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN MONETARY MACROECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 1-18.
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accounting report that estimates a firm's net worth for a given
moment in time by subtracting what the firm owes to creditors from
what the firm owns and is owed by others. Assets are the firm's
claims on others. Liabilities are what the firm owes to others.
Assets minus liabilities leaves what belongs to owners, called
"equity." In the analysis, liability structure as a whole is central
because it suggests how much and when the firm will face demands
for payment, which must be settled with liquid resources or
refinanced with another liability.9
Among firms in general, the liability structure of those that
borrow to lend-so called "financial intermediaries"-is particularly
telling of potential troubles because these firms influence how
nonfinancial firms fund themselves. A manufacturing or a services
firm will have financial items-liability and equity-on the right-
hand side of its balance sheet, but a financial intermediary has
financial claims on both sides of its balance sheet because it invests
borrowed money in the liabilities of other firms.
Commercial banks are the typical example of a firm that
borrows to lend, but if we define lending functionally then
investment banks, hedge and private equity funds, pension funds,
sovereign wealth funds, and other pools of investment capital are
also financial intermediaries. Like all firms, they leverage
themselves, borrowing to increase their ability to invest in other
firms, both financial and nonfinancial ones. Leveraging is a fact of
business life, but when a firm borrows too much, it risks its solvency
and its ability to honor contracts to others, because the firm's
liability structure becomes unsustainable.
Minsky saw a troubling pattern in the liability growth of firms
that borrow to lend. Again and again, their balance sheets would
become more fragile because they took on more debt and borrowed
on deteriorating credit terms.10 This cycle took place during good
times as firms would borrow at more speculative rates so as to hunt
for return in riskier investments, adding fragility to both sides of the
balance sheet. The rub was that these firms had to re-enter the
credit market to refinance liabilities. This was fine when interest
rates were stable, but tighter money meant certain loss when
refinancing at higher rates. Now that serial refinancing and
secondary trading are more common in the credit market, this
analysis is more relevant than ever.
He classified debt into three types based on its propensity to
require future refinancing, even in a rising interest rate
environment: hedged, speculative, and Ponzi. 11 In hedged
9. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE EcONOMY 165-67
(1986).
10. Id. at 213-20; see Jos6 Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and
Junk Loans in the New Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 475-76 (2009).
11. See MINSKY, supra note 9, at 206; Gabilondo, supra note 10, at 471-74.
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borrowing, the borrower could pay all maturing interest and
principal payments from the cash flow proceeds of the investment
made with the borrowed funds.12 In speculative borrowing, the
borrower could pay only interest from investment proceeds without
refinancing, having to re-enter the market to refinance some
amortization of principal.13 The riskiest of the three was Ponzi
borrowing because the initial terms of the debt meant that the
borrower would have to re-enter the credit market for all contractual
payments of interest or principal.14 So there is nothing shady per se
about Ponzi finance-it simply assumes that investment return will
keep escalating, which can be true for a while but not forever. The
distinction matters because many financial assets have useful lives
longer than an investor's holding period, so the asset's longer-term
value matters, especially on re-transfer.'5
This classification focuses on the borrower to emphasize its
liability structure. But it can also sort the lender's loan assets by
their risk from refinancing. For an asset to be deemed hedged, it
would have to be serviced from a dedicated income stream produced
by the investment of the loan proceeds. If the lender assumed that
the borrower would have to refinance some of the principal
payments-perhaps by further borrowing from the lender, as is
common with home equity lines of credit when the principal begins
to amortize-then the loan would be a speculative asset on the
lender's balance sheet. If the lender knew that the borrower would
need to refinance during each scheduled payment period, then the
loan asset would be Ponzi to both the lender and the borrower.
As the cycle accelerated during the last crisis, firms borrowed
and lent at increasingly speculative and Ponzi terms, setting up
their balance sheets for loss in the event that market prices ever
stopped escalating, which they always do. And when they did, this
fragility would devolve into a crisis in which financial promises
could not be kept on a grand scale, a so called "Minsky moment."16
Citigroup's chief executive officer Charles Prince said it best: "As
long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance."17 The
result was borrowing and lending yourself (and others) into financial
instability.
12. See MINSKY, supra note 9, at 206-07.
13. Id. at 207.
14. Id. at 207-08.
15. Id. at 174.
16. Justin Lahart, In the Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains
Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at Al.
17. The whole quote is even more troubling because it knowingly discounts
the liquidity crashes that are in the making: "When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've
got to get up and dance." Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish
Citigroup is 'Still Dancing' to the Beat of the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 10,
2007, at 1.
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The fragility cycle in the financial crisis of 2007 emerges in time
series data of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association.18 Figure 1 compares gross corporate debt issuance from
1990 to 2009 by firms, both financial and nonfinancial. The increase
in debt issuance starts in 2000. After peaking in 2006 (the last full
year before the crash), issuance dropped, with the low numbers in
2008 and 2009 reflecting the challenges firms faced in raising new
debt capital after the crash.
FIGURE 1
Total Corporate Debt Issuance (in billions)
3000
2500
2000 -
1500 -
1000 -500 I
Gross debt issuance tells only part of the story. A firm with
enough equity can sustain a corresponding debt load, even during
periods of financial stability. It is rising leverage that adds up to
financial instability.19  So Figure 2 tracks leverage trends by
dividing the amount of debt that corporations issued by the equity
capital raised during the same period. Between 1990 and 2001, the
leverage ratio ranged from between 4:1 and 6:1, suggesting the "old
normal." During 2001, the Federal Reserve began to tamp down
18. U.S. Corporate Issuance, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTs. ASs'N,
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/ResearchlStatistics/StatisticsFiles/CM-US-
Key-Stats-SIFMA.xls (last visited Aug. 30, 2011). Borrowing by households and
government units also contributed to these conditions, but this Article focuses
only on borrowing by private business units.
19. See, e.g., MINSKY, supra note 9, at 220-21.
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interest rates, 20 and from then on, easy money fed the cycle, which
peaked in 2006. That year, corporations issued fourteen dollars of
debt for every dollar of equity-double and, in some cases, triple the
leverage ratios of the old normal.
FIGURE 2
Leverage Ratio (1990-2009)
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Leverage Ratio= corporate debt issuancelequityissuance (common and preferred)
The financial correction originated during the third quarter of 2007
as markets began to be spooked, and by the end of that year the
leverage ratio had dropped to 10:1. During the heart of the financial
crisis, in 2008 and 2009, the ratio was back to the old normal,
although it feels like deprivation after the bubble.
Insofar as they were securitized into private-label mortgage-
backed securities bought by commercial banks, some of these
liabilities ended up on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve
("Fed"). Doing just what a central bank should, the Fed lent money
against collateral and bought bank assets outright during the crisis,
although the ultimate quality of some of these acquisitions remains
to be seen.21 As a result, the Fed's financial structure morphed.
Figure 3 compares its balance sheet in March 200722 (before the
20. Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount Rates,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (last visited Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.newyorkfed.org
/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html.
21. Sudeep Reddy & Anusha Shrivastava, Fed's Lending Ebbs as Crisis
Subdues, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A2.
22. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., Consolidated Statement of
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trouble started) with those of March 200923 and March 2010,24 after
the Fed's liquidity and credit programs had been largely completed.
During this period, the Fed's leverage ratio increased from 27:1 to
44:1.
FIGURE 3
TRENDS IN FED BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION (IN MILLIONS)
2007 2009 2010
Total Assets $873,681 $2,073,227 $2,316,525
Securities held $780,890 $761,295 $2,017,955
outright
U.S. Treasuries $780,890 $474,746 $776,667
Total Liabilities $841,066 $2,027,045 $2,263,487
Deposits from $18,429 $822,412 $1,147,747
depository institutions
Total Capital $32,615 $46,182 $53,037
Leverage Ratio 1:27 1:45 1:44
(Leverage ratio is
calculated by comparing
Total Capital to Total
Assets)
During this period, the asset portfolio of the Fed more than
doubled, while the credit quality and liquidity of the assets declined.
In 2007, U.S. Treasury securities were almost 90% of the Fed's asset
portfolio. 25 By 2010, they made up only 33% as the Fed acquired
investments in private-label mortgage-backed securities ("MBS"),
which were then trading at a steep discount. 26 Though riskier than
Treasury securities, these investments are not themselves
subprime, as they tend to be super-senior investment-grade rated
tranches of MBS. 2 7 This means that junior tranches in these MBS
Condition of All Federal Reserve Banks, in FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE H.4.1 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20070329/h41.pdf.
23. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., Consolidated Statement of
Condition of All Federal Reserve Banks, in FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE H.4.1 (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/releases/h4l/20090326/h41.pdf.
24. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., Consolidated Statement of
Condition of All Federal Reserve Banks, in FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE H.4.1 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/releases/h4l/20100325/h41.pdf.
25. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 22 (percentage
derived by dividing current "U.S. Treasury" securities by "Total assets").
26. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 24 (percentage
derived by dividing current "U.S. Treasury" securities by "Total assets").
27. See generally MKTs. GRP. OF THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.ORK,
MARKETS GROUP OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, DOMESTIC OPEN
MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2010, at 11-16 (Mar. 2011), available at
4752011]1
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will be the first to shoulder losses if borrowers default on the
underlying loans. Time may show that the market discounted their
value too much, giving the benefit of the bargain to the Fed. 28 In
this case, it will be the taxpayer who benefits-the Fed is a proxy for
the country's general fund because each year, the central bank
transfers its net profit to the Treasury, which, in a corporate finance
sense, is the Fed's residual claimant. 29
As the Fed took on these new assets, its own leverage spiked
since it funded its balance sheet growth by borrowing, mainly
through taking deposits of commercial banks. In 2007, these
deposits made up just over 2% of the Fed's liability base. 30 By 2010,
they had increased sixty-fold, amounting to 50% of the institution's
liability base.3' In large part, these deposits represent resources
that the Fed had made available to banks through stabilization
programs. Even commercial banks know that few things feel as
good as money in the bank, so they deposited these resources rather
than making new loans to firms and individuals, which would have
created new loan assets for these banks.
Though it seems to be a monolith, the new Fed is best
understood as a complex of separate balance sheets, each with its
own distinct asset-liability schedule and an ad hoc governance
regime that serves different public purposes.32 With respect to the
special-purpose balance sheet created by taking on the private label
MBS of commercial banks, the central bank lent its balance sheet to
the banks by letting them substitute a Fed-backed asset with no
credit risk but some inflation risk (the bank's Fed deposit) for the
private label MBS about which a panicked market was being
finicky. In effect, this on-balance sheet venture takes the place of a
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omolomo201O.pdf (describing the Fed's
complete portfolio at the close of 2010).
28. Jerry Markham, Regulating Credit Default Swaps in the Wake of the
Subprime Crisis 19 (2009) (unpublished working paper for Int'l Monetary Fund
Seminar on Current Dev. in Monetary and Fin. Law) (on file with author).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 290 (2006). See generally Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Federal
Reserve Accounting and Its Solvency, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.hnn.us/blogs/entries/137460.html (discussing Fed changes to its
accounting for remittances to Treasury).
30. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 22 (percentage
derived by dividing current "deposits" of "Depository institutions" by "Total
liabilities").
31. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 24 (percentage
derived by dividing current "deposits" of "Depository institutions" by "Total
liabilities").
32. See, e.g., Peter Stella, The Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet: What
Happened and Why It Matters (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/09/120,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wpo912o.pdf
(arguing that assets acquired due to financial rescue interventions are "policy"
assets as distinguished from the ordinary monetary ones acquired during
routine central bank operations).
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free-standing resolution vehicle, like the Resolution Trust
Corporation used after the savings and loan crisis. 33
In Minsky's analysis, the Fed validated the speculative and
Ponzi investment decisions of banks by buying their assets closer to
par than to their then-impaired market value.34 This probably made
the Fed the last bank in the cycle to do a speculative Ponzi trade,
albeit for the public interest. Although these credit terms are
unsustainable for private firms, a central bank can depart more
freely from hedged borrowing and lending because it has a monopoly
on the production of legal tender and, hence, faces no short-term
pressure to be profitable in a real sense. And because the Fed can
hold debt to maturity more freely than private banks, it has time to
ride out the troughs of economic cycles.
Overall, the financial sector has been substantially mended
through this Fed initiative, other efforts to recapitalize the banking
system by shoring up assets, and troubled asset relief program
("TARP") support for the liability side of bank balance sheets. What
has not worked as well is the spreading of this recovered stability
onto consumers and other firms, as banks remain cautious about
lending. This bottleneck of liquidity in the financial sector may
reflect that chastened banks have yet to reenter the early stage of
the cycle, in which more hedged borrowing and lending takes place.
More research is needed to understand the links between the
financial sector and the real economy-the topic of the Levy
Economics Institute's 2011 Minsky Conference.35
B. Contesting Market Primacy in the Age of Ideology
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis addressed how
individual firms borrow and invest and how these behaviors-in the
aggregate-lead to sectoral tendencies. 36 As noted above, this was
so because, left to their own devices, financial markets tended to
overheat, leading the public sector to intervene as needed against
the confidence (panic) cycle. At the same time, the public sector
could precipitate instability by removing regulatory restraints on
speculative and Ponzi financial activity. Implicated in this are
political economy questions about whether real markets work as
theorized, how much state influence over economic life is justified,
33. On the Resolution Trust Corporation, see generally Lee Davison, The
Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, 1989-1993 (pts. 1 & 2), 18 FDIC
BANKING REV., no. 2, 2006 at 38, no. 3, 2006 at 1.
34. See MINSKY, supra note 9, at 206-08.
35. Press Release, Levy Economics Institute, Leading Economists and
Policymakers to Discuss Ongoing Impact of the Global Financial Crisis at the
Levy Economics Institute's 20th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference (Apr. 11,
2011), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/4 11_11.pdf.
36. See generally Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis
(Levy Economics Inst. Working Paper No. 74, 1992), available at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf.
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whether individuals are rugged enough to go it alone or whether
unavoidable human vulnerabilities call for systematic state action,
and who should pay for non-private costs of bailouts.
So around the core of the financial instability thesis, we can
imagine criticism of ideologies that promote financial instability by
hamstringing the public sector's efforts to counter the cycle. For
example, some economic orthodoxies may deny that financial crises
recur, insisting on inaction because, like the common cold, these
cycles will work themselves out in time. 37 Moreover, ideological
orthodoxy in economic matters from anywhere on the spectrum can
exacerbate crises by not being flexible when what is needed is
pragmatism. For example, the Community Reinvestment Act 38-
pushed by Democrats and progressives-encouraged commercial
banks to originate subprime mortgage loans.39 Because of their
foreseeable exposure to interest rate risk from refinancing, when
underwritten, many of these loans would almost certainly have been
classified as speculative or Ponzi assets. The subprime market grew
in tandem with deregulation of financial markets, 40 a view promoted
from across the aisle but which, converging on federal efforts to
promote homeownership, intensified the trends toward financial
instability.
While ideologies that promote financial stability can come from
either side of the aisle, the Right has largely captured the terrain of
finance. Since the 1980s, the United States has witnessed a
flowering of anarcho-capitalist, libertarian, neoconservative, and
reactionary social formations that, despite other differences, unite
against financial regulation. 41 We have yet to appreciate how these
networking successes have rezoned our political imagination Right-
ward, even that of liberals and supporters of financial regulation.
Because Minsky died as these formations were quickening, he did
not get much of a chance to contest them using the financial
instability thesis. For example, many who would shudder at the
label "Keynesian" have referred to a "Minsky moment" without
37. See, e.g., Gabilondo, supra note 10, at 247-54 (giving examples of
objection to financial cycle theory).
38. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
39. See Markham, supra note 28, at 4-7 (noting that large banking
organizations seeking approval for mergers from the Federal Reserve pledged to
allocate credit to borrowers who may not have otherwise met credit
underwriting standards).
40. Philip Ashton, Troubled Assets: Financial Emergencies and Racialized
Risk 7 (May 2009) (unpublished working paper for Great Cities Inst.), available
at http://www.uic.edulcuppa/gcilworkingpapers/Ashton Phil_5.09.pdf.
41. These political alliances against regulation flow out of the generic
mobilization of the new Right that began in 1968 with Richard Nixon and
reached its apotheosis through the "emerging Republican majority" theorized by
Kevin Phillips. Jos4 Gabilondo, When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets The
New Right Get Away With Murder, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 618-21 (2009).
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owning the wider context for the financial instability thesis. It is
ironic because Minsky sought to give a fuller account of John
Maynard Keynes' radicalism, which he thought had been excised by
the economics establishment of Keynes' day when it accepted his
work. Minsky wanted to integrate the excluded elements.42
This latent dimension of Minsky's work deserves extending
because its technical credibility could counter some of the ideological
posturing advanced in the name of capitalism. In fact, there is more
than one conception of capitalism, and his views might help
elaborate alternative forms. This point matters because, despite the
debt overhang from the last crisis, neoliberal hostility toward
financial regulation is back in arguments based on market
primacy.43 This is the view that the uncoordinated, self-propelled
actions of unregulated private actors will lead to better outcomes for
them and for society than would state coordination. 44
Markets are said to be better than the state for utilitarian and
categorical reasons. First, the market is alleged to produce more
than the state would with the same resources. 45 And the market is
42. See generally Eric Tymiogne, Minsky and Economic Policy:
"Keynesianiasm"All Over Again? (Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No.
547, 2008), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_547.pdf
(contrasting Minsky's Keynesianism with mainstream Keynesianism).
43. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Dodd-Frank and the Return of the Loan Shark,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2011, at Al7 ("Congress can pass all the laws it wants, but
it can't repeal the law of supply and demand and the law of unintended
consequences.").
44. Ironically, given its role in promoting neoliberal values, it was a paper
on government securities by the International Monetary Fund that made me
see the inevitable role of the state in influencing market structure. See Peter
Dattels, The Microstructure of Government Securities Markets (Int'l Monetary
Fund Working Paper WP/95/117, 1995). The paper analyzes the choices that
governments have when setting up markets for their own public debt markets,
e.g., auction pricing, specialist versus market-makers. That there are choices to
be made by public officials negates any "naturalness" of market structure. A
second example came while at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
an inspection of the specialist system at the New York Stock Exchange. This
arrangement gives a monopoly on all the order flow for a security to one trader
(the specialist) in exchange for his duty to make a fair and orderly market. The
specialist does this by crossing the buy or sell orders of customers or, as needed,
by using his own capital to effect a trade. An aesthetic of price is at work that
favors incremental changes-in either direction-to swings. Issuers of the
specialist's securities could complain when-in their profoundly interested
opinion-the specialist had not "made markets" appropriately by creating a
bumpy price path. An investigation and market reconstruction would follow.
Here again were policy decisions at work rather than the canonical idea of
forces of supply and demand meeting at a clearing price-so wide-eyed claims
that markets are "free" suggest, to me, that the speaker is either profoundly
naive or disingenuous.
45. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN.
REV. 519 (1945) (emphasizing the importance of disbursed, localized knowledge
in the economy).
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better than the state on moral grounds because it stands in for pure
freedom.46 Adding the modifier "free" to "market" intensifies this
devotional quality, sacralizing the market.
In theoretical accounts of the financial system based-explicitly
or not--on market primacy, liabilities are no big deal. In a market,
it is assumed price mechanisms will adjust by themselves to reflect
the risks and effects of these liabilities. If a firm fails, creditors will
devour it. This is the take on liabilities in Merton Miller's
acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize, which he received for the
capital irrelevancy thesis. He said there was no such thing as an
"overleveraged" firm because market price mechanisms would
adjust its cost of debt and equity capital to reflect its risk.47 Lenders
would evaluate risk, bargain for an appropriate rate of return,
demand collateral as needed, and, if necessary, sue for breach.
There is no systemic risk here because all risk stays private.
True enough, if one stays inside of an abstraction that,
necessarily, assumes away actual liabilities, real financial risks, and
losses in the real world. So, in the market primacy narrative, there
was no "problem" with the 2007 crash. It was a routine repricing of
credit by forces of supply and demand, though the growth of the Fed
is not ideal.
C. Enter Reality Stage Right
However, market primacy faces some challenges. First,
financial crashes always spill over into the public sector. In the now
familiar script, an adventurous financial sector borrows itself into a
crisis that threatens innocent bystanders, drawing in even
advocates of market primacy. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 grew
out of the 1907 Knickerbocker Trust Company crisis;48 the New
Deal's financial architecture responded to speculative
overinvestment, intensified by easy margin credit;49 and the 1989
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
responded to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.50 The Act is
merely the last iteration of this political economy cycle. So models
that turn a blind eye to obvious, foreseeable public impact should be
taken with a grain of salt.
Second, it was supply and demand-the self-adjusting
46. See, e.g., ROBERT NORZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
47. Merton H. Miller, Leverage, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 7, 1990), in 1990
Econ. Sci. 291, 298-300, available at http://nobelprize.org/nobeLprizes
/economics/laureates/1990/miller-lecture.pdf (arguing that unregulated market
forces can regulate the pricing of liabilities through interest rates).
48. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329,
379-80 (1996).
49. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New
Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 847-57 (2009).
50. Tim Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of Savings and the Loan Crisis:
Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. no. 2, 2000 at 26.
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hydraulics of market primacy-that contributed to the financial
crisis. After all, it was devotees of deregulation-George W. Bush in
the White House and Alan Greenspan at the Fed-who let subprime
debt mushroom thanks to easy money and, it would come to light
later, systematic mortgage fraud.5' The risk to the financial system
originated not in the state but-to further refute market primacy-
from innovation in an overheated private sector whose private-label
MBS came to displace the other MBS issued by government-
sponsored agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 52
The government's error was to validate this innovation by
investing in some of these private-label securities. 53 Lenders in
markets were wrong. And the quantitative financial models were
wrong too because they did not predict how markets act in a panic,
so called "extreme liquidity events." It is only the latest example of
mistaking unsustainable practices for benign financial innovation. 54
Were the marketplace of ideas and reputation to work as its
libertarian custodians claim, we could have shorted market primacy
and captured the spread as brand names like Alan Greenspan,
Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman went down in a bear raid.
Instead, the spirit of deregulation has survived a financial crisis
that it had a hand in creating. It is not as odd as it sounds because,
like limited liability for corporations, market primacy is a potent
distillation of exclusions, erasures, and omissions of facts that might
compromise its theoretical integrity. It saves face by ignoring
corporate insolvencies, credit scarcity, unemployment, foreclosures,
losses in retirement funds, growth in the federal deficit, incipient
inflation of energy and food, and sagging real estate values-in
other words, other people's problems. Indeed, it is these efficiencies
51. See, e.g., S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG.,
WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 95-
103 (2011).
52. An industry journal of the time noted the development with glee:
Now, issuers of private-label residential MBS are holding the aces
that were once held by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Once a junior-but powerful-player
in the market, private-label residential mortgage backed securities
(RMBS) are now the leading force driving product innovation and the
net overall volume of mortgage origination.
Robert Stowe England, The Rise of Private Label, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct.
2006, at 70, 70.
53. Theresa R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Past, Present, and
Future, 11 CITYSCAPE 231, 237 (2009) ("The private-label securities contributed
significantly to the GSEs' losses in 2008; in many cases, the value of the
securities fell as much as 90 percent from the time of purchase.").
54. Legal scholarship, in particular, has a duty to evaluate these practices
carefully, although it has not done so enough. See Charles R. P. Pouncy,
Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L.
REV. 505, 508 (1998) ("Legal scholarship has not produced critical examinations
of financial innovation as an economic process.... The products generated [by
financial innovation] are readily accepted and adjudged good.").
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of externalization that have allowed corporate profits to rebound
despite other weaknesses in the economy.66
An example of market primacy about the Act is the street's hue
and cry against the Act's mandate that regulators bear down more
on the swap markets. Swaps are financial bets about future price
movements that banks and other large firms place with each other,
acting as "counterparties." The Act requires the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and the banking agencies to establish
margin requirements and collateral policies to reduce the risk of
default on these bets.5 6 Doing so, it is thought, will reduce the risk
not only to the counterparties but to the financial system as a
whole.5 7
However, the prospect of regulation has been met with
objections by many firms, including nonfinancial ones that use
swaps for hedging rather for speculative investment.5 8 In part it is
because swaps are the poster child of imaginaries of the market.
Since Wendy Gramm, then head of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission, secured a major exemption from their
regulation in 1993,59 swaps have been sacralized as financial play in
the libertarian forest primeval, away from the grasping hands of the
state. The resistance from firms seems to have worked given the
broad exemptions that have been given to noncommercial end-users
of swaps.60
Once put in focus, market primacy shows up as an attack on the
very notion that there could be such a thing as a public interest and,
insofar as it is recognized to exist, justifying it only insofar as a
public function serves private interests. This is what lies behind
challenges to how the state provides services that have been the
hallmark of the public sector.
55. See Luca Di Leo & Jeff Bater, New Jobless Claims Cloud Economic
Outlook, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2011, at A3 (reporting increasing corporate
profits).
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 701-754, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1754 (2010) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
57. See generally Michael Greenburger, Overwhelming a Financial
Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank's Attack on
Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion
Dollar Derivatives, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 127 (2011).
58. Victoria McGrane, Risk Rule Riles Main Street: U.S. Wants Car Makers,
Brewers to Back Derivatives Bets with Cash; Cost at Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
2011, at Al (summarizing objections by nonfinancial users of swaps to CFTC's
margin and collateral proposals).
59. See Carolyn H. Jackson, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable
Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3221-22 (1999).
60. Cheyenne Hopkins & Joe Adler, Regulators Give Banks Win on Key
Derivatives Proposal, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13, 2011, at 1 (noting that pressure
from Congress resulted in ongoing exemptions from margin and collateral rules
for corporate end-users).
482 [Vol. 46
2011] NEITHER A BORROWER NOR A LENDER BE
Consider the new reach of market logic into higher education
and state government. A narrow cost logic is at work in legal
education through the American Bar Association's recent proposals
on security of position, reforms that would reduce the agency costs of
having faculty. 61 A similar cost logic is at play in reform proposals
about state government. The proposals to allow states to declare
bankruptcy would allow them to cleanse their balance sheets of
liabilities for the pensions of public employees. 62 Like the perennial
anti-hero of the Nightmare on Elm Street, Freddie Kreuger is back,
this time in the citadels of the public.
The attack is old news. What is new and worth attention is how
the discursive formations of reactionary thought are maturing. By
"discursive formation" I mean the way that institutions, individuals,
and political narratives move in tandem to form a new consensus of
reality, one that amplifies neoconservative values by erasing those
of others. At the institutional level, this is evidenced by the rise of
foundations and advocacy groups whose influence reaches deep into
private enterprise, the federal courts, and state government.63
These activist networks produce and market-and are in turn
legitimated by-narratives, symbols, and social scripts that create a
conceptual framework for understanding reality through a
reactionary lens. On economic matters, Minksy's theory can help to
contest these discursive formations of the Right.
II. INTERNALIZING LIABILITIES THROUGH THE DODD-FRANK ACT
If we believe, as did Minsky, that capitalist market systems
could be enhanced by mitigating leverage cycles, then we judge the
Act by whether it does so. Because it was passed during a window
of financial ruin that temporarily muffled some libertarian activists,
the Act does take some steps to limit financial instability caused by
liability financing. While market primacy shifts some of the costs of
overleveraging onto strangers, the Act tries to do the opposite,
allocating more of the total effect of liabilities onto those who
generate the debt. Below I discuss two examples of this
internalization: risk management rules for leverage created by
financial swaps and regulatory capital requirements that slow down,
rather than intensify, boom-bust cycles.
A. Limiting Swap-Induced Leverage
As explained here, many financial swaps include contingent
61. Mark Hansen, Too Much Momentum?, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 55.
62. See Lisa Lambert, State Bankruptcy Bill Imminent, Gingrich Says,
REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/21
/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-idUSTRE70K6PI20110121.
63. See generally Lester M. Salamon, The Resiliant Sector: The State of
Nonprofit America, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 3 (2002).
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leverage that springs into effect when the market moves against a
bank. These sudden market moves can turn a swap from an asset to
a liability or from a small liability to a giant one. An example
illustrates the problem. Assume that Party A and Party B enter
into an interest-rate swap. If the market moves against Party A,
the swap becomes an out-of-the-money position, with Party A owing
money to Party B as a net swap payable. 64 To Party B, the swap is
an asset because it is in-the-money and, hence, a net swap
receivable.
As this example shows, a swap can fluctuate between being an
asset or a liability based on market movements and contingencies
that are built into the swap. (Such was the case at AIG when swap
commitments made by its financial products unit became liabilities
rather than assets.) These market contingencies are the heart of the
bargain that is entered into every time someone enters into a swap
position. Moreover, because many swap counterparties waive
margin for an entity with a good credit rating, swaps can produce
uncollateralized debt that can suddenly increase a firm's effective
leverage.
The moral of the story is that the unintended-though
foreseeable-liabilities that can arise through swap contracts also
need provisioning and risk management. The Act reduces the
growth of speculative and Ponzi liabilities that might arise from
swaps activities-especially by financial firms-by requiring that
standardized swaps be settled through a clearinghouse that would
impose margin requirements to eliminate the risk that a liability
would lack adequate collateral. 65
Once swaps clear on a central counter party, each member will
have to post initial margin, post variation margin based on market
changes, and make a contribution to the guarantee/clearing fund as
it begins to accumulate a liability with respect to a swap position.
Centralized clearing of swaps and margining generally may also
reduce the funding liquidity of some firms. Not all swaps will have
to be cleared centrally. To create a kind of parity, the Act also
imposes margin and collateral rules on swaps that remain on the
64. This is what out-of-the-money credit swaps did to AIG. See Mary
Williams Walsh, Risky Trading Wasn't Just on the Fringe at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2010, at B1.
65. For those swaps that are cleared bilaterally rather than being moved to
a central clearing house, an additional regulatory capital charge may apply on
the theory that this nonstandard position imposes more systemic risk than a
position that has been moved to a CCP. See Margin and Capital Requirements
for Covered Swap Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27564 (proposed May 11, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 45, 237, 324, 624, 1221); Capital Requirements of
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 27802 (proposed May
12, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23, 140); Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg
23732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 23).
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books of the original counterparties. 66  The margin rules for
uncleared swaps may also reduce the funding liquidity of swap
counterparties who post margin.
From the perspective of the financial instability hypothesis, do
the new clearing and margin rules for swaps increase or decrease
financial fragility? To apply Minsky's debt classification to the new
swap rules, first convert the margin or collateral into an income
stream that backs the interest payments and amortization of
principal on the debt.67 The analysis is different for cleared and
uncleared swaps.
The margin requirements keep the individual clearing members
from accumulating uncollateralized liabilities to the clearing house.
This limits the risk that swaps will add speculative and Ponzi
exposure to the liability structure of a clearing member. The swaps
clearing house will be subject to strict risk management rules that
limit its overall risk.68 Assuming, then, that it behaves like clearing
houses for other asset classes, the swaps clearing house will not
generate speculative or Ponzi risk.
The implications of margin on an uncleared swap, that is, one
that stays on the books of the counterparties, follow below using the
example from above. As suggested, Party A is short on the swap
and would have to post margin to cover his liability to Party B. By
collateralizing this debt, Party A's liability structure moves toward
hedged borrowing from speculative and Ponzi positions. Posting
margin may reduce Party A's borrowing cost because Party B should
accept a lower interest rate on collateralized debt. If Party A posts
cash collateral, however, its balance sheet also becomes less liquid
and it is left with less unpledged collateral. Less potential collateral
limits Party A's ability to invest in the other firms (including in the
liabilities) and its own ability to borrow on a collateralized basis.
The leverage and liquidity implications are the converse to
Party B, who receives margin from Party A. By reducing
counterparty credit risk to Party A, the margin shifts Party B's asset
structure toward hedged from a potentially more speculative or
Ponzi position. If Party B can re-hypothecate the margin collateral,
he has two more options. First, he can collateralize his own debts,
making his own liability structure more hedged. Second, he could
do the opposite by using the collateral to borrow more and use the
proceeds to acquire a new asset, whose value would reflect the
leveraged demand made possible by borrowing.
Given that margin can directly affect a firm's access to liquid
66. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731, 124 Stat. 1376, 1703-12 (2010).
67. Though not explicit, Minsky's classification appears to assume
uncollateralized borrowing. The following discussion applies the leveraged
liquidity framework developed in my article on leveraged loans. Gabilondo,
supra note 10, at 474-76.
68. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(D), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688-89 (2010).
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resources and its ability to leverage itself, the new margin rules-
both for cleared and uncleared swaps-give regulators another tool
that can be used counter-cyclically against the confidence (crisis)
cycle. A tight collateral policy during good times would slow down
growth, but a loose collateral policy on the downside of a credit
bubble would take pressure off firms.69
The effects are more variable in the case above of an uncleared
swap, because margin redistributes risk, liquidity, and leverage
between the payor and payee. Because neither the market nor
regulation require all liabilities to be margined, the ultimate effect
of imposing margin on leverage created by uncleared swaps will
depend on the opportunity costs to the payor of posting margin and
the reinvestment opportunities to the payee.
Two other provisions of the Act that further limit the risk of
sudden leverage from financial swaps by limiting the amount of
swaps activity that certain financial institutions engage in are the
Volcker Rule70 and the swaps pushout rule.71  Both require
divestiture by many banks of certain derivatives activity. The
Volcker Rule limits the amount of swaps activity that a bank can
conduct. Separately, the swaps pushout rule limits the ability of
banks to enter into swap agreements for their own account,
although some important exceptions remain, including entering into
swaps positions to accommodate customer interest. Together, these
provisions may cleanse much springing and contingent leverage out
of the bank.
B. Countercyclical Capital Requirements
The Act also nods to Minsky by calling for capital requirements
that go against rather than with the prevailing direction of the
business cycle. 72
Federal law requires a bank's capital structure to meet certain
prudential standards for its balance sheet. 73 Potential investors
69. This is what the Fed did by expanding the kinds of acceptable collateral
that banks could use for discount window borrowing. See Steve Goldstein, Fed
Expands Auction, Accepts Wider Collateral, MARKETWATCH (May 2, 2008),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-expands-auction-accepts-wider-collatera
1-to-boost-liquidity-200852105100.
70. See Megan Davies & Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Volcker Impact Sends
Shivers Through Banks, REUTERS, Aug. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/09/uk-volcker-idUSLNE67800N2010080
9.
71. Annette L. Nazareth, Dodd-Frank Act Finalizes Swap Pushout Rule,
HARv. L.F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (July 7, 2010, 9:13 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2010/07/07/dodd-frank-act-finalizes-swap-p
ushout-rule.
72. Michael Kowalik, Countercyclical Capital Regulation, FED. RES. KAN.
CITY EcoN. REV., 2d Quarter 2011, at 63, 63-64, available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/1lq2Kowalik.pdf.
73. For an example, see 12 C.F.R. § 3 (2011) for the regulatory capital rules
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may apply more stringent standards, but federal law establishes the
minimum. These standards promote solvency by measuring the
bank's assets conservatively and ensuring that the bank has enough
equity capital free from the contractual constraints that creditors
impose on debt financing. The standards do this by subjecting the
bank's balance sheet to various solvency and liquidity tests, each of
which must be satisfied for the bank to remain in the best standing
with its federal regulator.
For example, the tests promote conservative valuation when
determining the bank's net worth (reflected in its equity capital) by
aggressively discounting assets to reflect what they might fetch in a
distressed market.74 These asset discounts reduce the bank's net
worth on a dollar-for-dollar basis, a loss that is born first and wholly
by the bank's equity. So a bank's net worth calculated for its
regulatory capital requirements will often be lower than its net
worth based on generally accepted accounting principles. This is
how the conservative valuation is accomplished. The federal
government wants to have this conservative measure because the
federal promise to insure certain bank deposits leaves the
government on the hook as a back-up source of downside risk capital
if the bank fails.
To complement this conservatism, other tests apply to the right-
hand side of the bank's balance sheet. These rules are conservative
because they limit how much the bank can leverage itself with
borrowed money, including federally-insured deposits. The limit is
expressed as a multiple of the equity that determines the maximum
amount of debt that the bank can take on.75 Capping debt leverage
increases the bank's financing costs because the interest costs of
debt are deductible, while equity investors demand a higher rate of
return for investing as owners. Hence, a bank-like any firm-
tends to pay more for equity capital than for debt capital. Although
there is no limit to how much owners can make from a successful
company, lenders can, at best, expect to receive only their
contractual entitlement. As a result, lenders have more contractual
rights to protect their expectancy in the firm than do its owners.
Enough equity reassures regulators that the bank has an adequate
resource cushion free from the contractual rights that, if breached,
give the creditor rights to interfere in how the bank is run. One
that apply to national banks.
74. See Kowalik, supra note 72, at 66.
75. For example, banks are generally required to hold 4% of their financial
capital, i.e., debt and equity capital, in relatively permanent forms of risk
capital designed to bear residual loss known as Tier 1 capital, e.g., common
stock and noncumulative preferred stock. Id. at 80 n.6. Disregarding for the
moment other capital ratio rules that apply, that requirement would limit the
bank's potential debt to equity ratio to 25:1. In practice, it is lower because of
concurrent requirements that apply to less residual forms of financing like
subordinated debt.
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effect of ensuring a minimum amount of owner's capital is to limit
the overall size of the bank's liability base with respect to which the
bank owes contractual duties that limit its freedom of action.
At present, these regulatory capital requirements have the
unintended effect of amplifying the credit cycle.76 When interest
rates are low and the bank can easily make loans, its assets
increase, marking up the bank's net worth and making it easier for
the bank to borrow more, replenishing its ability to repeat the asset
growth-equity-growth-borrowing growth cycle. More credit means
more dollars chasing the same assets, which means that prices go up
in the aggregate. The discounts used to haircut assets do not take
into account the risk that assets are rising because a credit bubble
may be underway, based on unsustainable escalation of market
values. As a result, the intended conservatism of regulatory capital
is somewhat offset by inflated asset, equity, and debt values. So the
capital tests do nothing to slow down this inflation and, instead, by
continuing to signal that the bank is solvent and liquid, give a green
light as the bubble inflates.
The opposite kind of amplification happens as the bubble
deflates. This time, the market value of outstanding loan assets
begins to drop, shrinking the bank's balance sheet as the market
applies a haircut of its own. Regulatory capital makes matters
worse by adding another asset haircut, one that may be less justified
because the market is already discounting. Every time an asset
loses a dollar of value, the bank's net worth (its equity capital) drops
by a dollar. As the equity base shrinks this way, the bank loses its
ability to keep borrowing because of the leverage limits keyed to the
bank's equity. To avoid losing regulatory status by becoming over-
leveraged, the bank will begin contracting. If this means cutting its
leverage, then the bank may have to dispose of assets to pay a
liability.
Unfortunately, the asset may fetch less than par in a hasty sale,
so the bank may face a nasty cycle of deleveraging leading to fire
sale prices, leading to more deleveraging.77 Moreover, during this
cycle credit is harder to get because the bank is pickier about
investing in loan assets, the more attractive ones being those not
subject to a regulatory asset haircut because they boost the bank's
net worth most directly. Less credit means fewer dollars chasing
the same assets, which drives prices down. So, on the downside of
the cycle, regulatory capital rules discourage lending just when the
76. See generally James B. Thomas & Joseph Haubrich, Keeping Banks
Strong: Countercyclical Capital Requirements, FOREFRONT, Winter 2011, at 16,
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/forefront/2011/winter/pdf/ff_2011
_winter_07.pdf.
77. See, e.g., Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Subprime Crisis: Size,
Deleveraging and Some Policy Options, 2008 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 29
(examining deleveraging of subprime mortgages).
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market could use a boost from more credit.
One way to mitigate the tendency of regulatory capital to
amplify the direction of the boom-bust cycle in asset prices would be
by taking account of whether asset prices were rising or falling and,
consequently, whether the market was overestimating or over-
discounting an asset's ultimate value. On the upswing of the cycle
as banks expand their balance sheets with new loans-adding
inflationary momentum by financing more demand-banks should
be subject to higher rates of required equity on the right-hand side
of the balance sheet. Because equity capital is more expensive and
generally harder to get, increasing the equity bite delays the bank's
ability to keep growing with borrowed funds. This pause in
financing on the upside is likely to slow down asset growth.
The opposite happens on the downswing. As the value of
outstanding loan assets begins to drop, the regulatory discounts on
the asset values should be relaxed, avoiding a direct dollar-for-dollar
reduction in net worth for every loss in a loan asset. Preserving the
bank's net worth this way keeps it from having to quickly deleverage
by shedding impaired assets into an already illiquid market. This
cannot stop the cycle, but it slows it down and tries to produce a
softer landing.
This is what is meant by countercyclical requirements.
Reducing the unintended and highly undesirable amplification of
the boom-bust cycle caused by regulatory capital rules goes to the
heart of Minsky's advice for reducing the growth of fragility and
slowing down the contraction of debt-financed consumer demand.
Banking regulators have recommended that regulatory capital
eliminate this procyclicality by building in additional counter-
cyclical capital requirements.78  Many implementation issues
remain but it is an important step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
New financing arrangements will always require original
analysis to determine how they affect the financial system as a
whole. That analysis should draw on liquidity and leverage axioms
derived from Minsky's framework about financial instability. Doing
so would help to forecast an individual firm's financial future,
especially if it must refinance. This kind of analysis also sheds light
on how firm borrowing impacts the stability of the financial system
as a whole. Now more than ever, perspectives like this matter
because the ultimate impact of the Dodd-Frank Act still hangs in
the balance. If implemented in good faith, the Act could enhance
our capitalist system by mitigating financial cycles. Whether or not
78. See Kowalik, supra note 72, at 66-69; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION OF THE BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL
BUFFER PROPOSAL (July 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl72.pdf.
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it will live up to this promise remains to be seen.
